«AASB Standard AASB 10 August 2011 Consolidated Financial Statements Obtaining a Copy of this Accounting Standard This Standard is available on the ...»
Example 4 An investor acquires 48 per cent of the voting rights of an investee.
The remaining voting rights are held by thousands of shareholders, none individually holding more than 1 per cent of the voting rights.
None of the shareholders has any arrangements to consult any of the others or make collective decisions. When assessing the proportion of voting rights to acquire, on the basis of the relative
Example 5 Investor A holds 40 per cent of the voting rights of an investee and twelve other investors each hold 5 per cent of the voting rights of the investee. A shareholder agreement grants investor A the right to appoint, remove and set the remuneration of management responsible for directing the relevant activities. To change the agreement, a two-thirds majority vote of the shareholders is required. In this case, investor A concludes that the absolute size of the investor’s holding and the relative size of the other shareholdings alone are not conclusive in determining whether the investor has rights sufficient to give it power. However, investor A determines that its contractual right to appoint, remove and set the remuneration of management is sufficient to conclude that it has power over the investee. The fact that investor A might not have exercised this right or the likelihood of investor A exercising its right to select, appoint or remove management shall not be considered when assessing whether investor A has power.
B44 In other situations, it may be clear after considering the factors listed in paragraph B42(a)–(c) alone that an investor does not have power.
Application example Example 6 Investor A holds 45 per cent of the voting rights of an investee.
Two other investors each hold 26 per cent of the voting rights of the investee. The remaining voting rights are held by three other shareholders, each holding 1 per cent. There are no other arrangements that affect decision-making. In this case, the size of investor A’s voting interest and its size relative to the other shareholdings are sufficient to conclude that investor A does not have power. Only two other investors would need to co-operate to be able to prevent investor A from directing the relevant activities of the investee.
AASB 10 APPENDIX B B45 However, the factors listed in paragraph B42(a)–(c) alone may not be conclusive. If an investor, having considered those factors, is unclear whether it has power, it shall consider additional facts and circumstances, such as whether other shareholders are passive in nature as demonstrated by voting patterns at previous shareholders’ meetings.
This includes the assessment of the factors set out in paragraph B18 and the indicators in paragraphs B19 and B20. The fewer voting rights the investor holds, and the fewer parties that would need to act together to outvote the investor, the more reliance would be placed on the additional facts and circumstances to assess whether the investor’s rights are sufficient to give it power. When the facts and circumstances in paragraphs B18–B20 are considered together with the investor’s rights, greater weight shall be given to the evidence of power in paragraph B18 than to the indicators of power in paragraphs B19 and B20.
Example 7 An investor holds 45 per cent of the voting rights of an investee.
Eleven other shareholders each hold 5 per cent of the voting rights of the investee. None of the shareholders has contractual arrangements to consult any of the others or make collective decisions. In this case, the absolute size of the investor’s holding and the relative size of the other shareholdings alone are not conclusive in determining whether the investor has rights sufficient to give it power over the investee. Additional facts and circumstances that may provide evidence that the investor has, or does not have, power shall be considered.
Example 8 An investor holds 35 per cent of the voting rights of an investee.
Three other shareholders each hold 5 per cent of the voting rights of the investee. The remaining voting rights are held by numerous other shareholders, none individually holding more than 1 per cent of the voting rights. None of the shareholders has arrangements to consult any of the others or make collective decisions. Decisions about the relevant activities of the investee require the approval of a majority of votes cast at relevant shareholders’ meetings—75 per cent of the voting rights of the investee have been cast at recent relevant shareholders’ meetings. In this case, the active participation of the other shareholders at recent shareholders’ meetings indicates that the investor would not have the practical
B46 If it is not clear, having considered the factors listed in paragraph B42(a)–(d), that the investor has power, the investor does not control the investee.
Potential voting rights B47 When assessing control, an investor considers its potential voting rights as well as potential voting rights held by other parties, to determine whether it has power. Potential voting rights are rights to obtain voting rights of an investee, such as those arising from convertible instruments or options, including forward contracts. Those potential voting rights are considered only if the rights are substantive (see paragraphs B22–B25).
B48 When considering potential voting rights, an investor shall consider the purpose and design of the instrument, as well as the purpose and design of any other involvement the investor has with the investee. This includes an assessment of the various terms and conditions of the instrument as well as the investor’s apparent expectations, motives and reasons for agreeing to those terms and conditions.
B49 If the investor also has voting or other decision-making rights relating to the investee’s activities, the investor assesses whether those rights, in combination with potential voting rights, give the investor power.
B50 Substantive potential voting rights alone, or in combination with other rights, can give an investor the current ability to direct the relevant activities. For example, this is likely to be the case when an investor holds 40 per cent of the voting rights of an investee and, in accordance with paragraph B23, holds substantive rights arising from options to acquire a further 20 per cent of the voting rights.
Application examples Example 9 Investor A holds 70 per cent of the voting rights of an investee.
Investor B has 30 per cent of the voting rights of the investee as well as an option to acquire half of investor A’s voting rights. The option is exercisable for the next two years at a fixed price that is AASB 10 APPENDIX B deeply out of the money (and is expected to remain so for that twoyear period). Investor A has been exercising its votes and is actively directing the relevant activities of the investee. In such a case, investor A is likely to meet the power criterion because it appears to have the current ability to direct the relevant activities.
Although investor B has currently exercisable options to purchase additional voting rights (that, if exercised, would give it a majority of the voting rights in the investee), the terms and conditions associated with those options are such that the options are not considered substantive.
Example 10 Investor A and two other investors each hold a third of the voting rights of an investee. The investee’s business activity is closely related to investor A. In addition to its equity instruments, investor A also holds debt instruments that are convertible into ordinary shares of the investee at any time for a fixed price that is out of the money (but not deeply out of the money). If the debt were converted, investor A would hold 60 per cent of the voting rights of the investee. Investor A would benefit from realising synergies if the debt instruments were converted into ordinary shares. Investor A has power over the investee because it holds voting rights of the investee together with substantive potential voting rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities.
Power when voting or similar rights do not have a significant effect on the investee’s returns B51 In assessing the purpose and design of an investee (see paragraphs B5– B8), an investor shall consider the involvement and decisions made at the investee’s inception as part of its design and evaluate whether the transaction terms and features of the involvement provide the investor with rights that are sufficient to give it power. Being involved in the design of an investee alone is not sufficient to give an investor control.
However, involvement in the design may indicate that the investor had the opportunity to obtain rights that are sufficient to give it power over the investee.
B52 In addition, an investor shall consider contractual arrangements such as call rights, put rights and liquidation rights established at the investee’s inception. When these contractual arrangements involve activities that are closely related to the investee, then these activities are, in substance, an integral part of the investee’s overall activities, even though they may occur outside the legal boundaries of the investee.
Therefore, explicit or implicit decision-making rights embedded in
B53 For some investees, relevant activities occur only when particular circumstances arise or events occur. The investee may be designed so that the direction of its activities and its returns are predetermined unless and until those particular circumstances arise or events occur.
In this case, only the decisions about the investee’s activities when those circumstances or events occur can significantly affect its returns and thus be relevant activities. The circumstances or events need not have occurred for an investor with the ability to make those decisions to have power. The fact that the right to make decisions is contingent on circumstances arising or an event occurring does not, in itself, make those rights protective.
An investee’s only business activity, as specified in its founding documents, is to purchase receivables and service them on a day-today basis for its investors. The servicing on a day-to-day basis includes the collection and passing on of principal and interest payments as they fall due. Upon default of a receivable the investee automatically puts the receivable to an investor as agreed separately in a put agreement between the investor and the investee.
The only relevant activity is managing the receivables upon default because it is the only activity that can significantly affect the investee’s returns. Managing the receivables before default is not a relevant activity because it does not require substantive decisions to be made that could significantly affect the investee’s returns – the activities before default are predetermined and amount only to collecting cash flows as they fall due and passing them on to investors. Therefore, only the investor’s right to manage the assets upon default should be considered when assessing the overall activities of the investee that significantly affect the investee’s returns. In this example, the design of the investee ensures that the investor has decision-making authority over the activities that significantly affect the returns at the only time that such decisionmaking authority is required. The terms of the put agreement are integral to the overall transaction and the establishment of the investee. Therefore, the terms of the put agreement together with the founding documents of the investee lead to the conclusion that the investor has power over the investee even though the investor takes ownership of the receivables only upon default and manages
The only assets of an investee are receivables. When the purpose and design of the investee are considered, it is determined that the only relevant activity is managing the receivables upon default.
The party that has the ability to manage the defaulting receivables has power over the investee, irrespective of whether any of the borrowers have defaulted.
B54 An investor may have an explicit or implicit commitment to ensure that an investee continues to operate as designed. Such a commitment may increase the investor’s exposure to variability of returns and thus increase the incentive for the investor to obtain rights sufficient to give it power. Therefore a commitment to ensure that an investee operates as designed may be an indicator that the investor has power, but does not, by itself, give an investor power, nor does it prevent another party from having power.
Exposure, or rights, to variable returns from an investee B55 When assessing whether an investor has control of an investee, the investor determines whether it is exposed, or has rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee.
B56 Variable returns are returns that are not fixed and have the potential to vary as a result of the performance of an investee. Variable returns can be only positive, only negative or both positive and negative (see paragraph 15). An investor assesses whether returns from an investee are variable and how variable those returns are on the basis of the substance of the arrangement and regardless of the legal form of the returns. For example, an investor can hold a bond with fixed interest payments. The fixed interest payments are variable returns for the purpose of this Standard because they are subject to default risk and they expose the investor to the credit risk of the issuer of the bond.
The amount of variability (ie how variable those returns are) depends on the credit risk of the bond. Similarly, fixed performance fees for managing an investee’s assets are variable returns because they expose the investor to the performance risk of the investee. The amount of variability depends on the investee’s ability to generate sufficient income to pay the fee.
AASB 10 APPENDIX B
B57 Examples of returns include:
(a) dividends, other distributions of economic benefits from an investee (eg interest from debt securities issued by the investee) and changes in the value of the investor’s investment in that investee.